Muslim-Americans in the Armed Forces

Yesterday, the New York Times published an interesting article by Andrea Elliott about some of the issues that Muslim-Americans who serve in the military have to deal with, including distrust, racism, moral dilemmas and condemnation in Muslim-immigrant communities.(http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/09/us/09muslim.html?ref=global-home).  The piece comes in the aftermath of the tragic shooting of Army soldiers by Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, a self-described Muslim, at Fort Hood on Thursday. 

Unfortunately, there may be a backlash against Muslim servicemembers in the wake of the shooting.  Gen. George Casey Jr., the Army chief of staff, warned against such a development on Sunday.  But given the dark side of human nature, and the fact that the military is fighting Islamic extremists in Iraq and Afghanistan, where soldiers and Marines have been attacked by members of the local security forces who were ostensibly allies, distrust of Muslims in uniform may increase as a result of last week’s attack.

That would be unfortunate for strategic and humanitarian reasons.  It might discourage Muslims from joining the military at a time when their linguistic and cultural knowledge is especially critical.  It could also negatively affect cohesion in units with Muslim servicemembers.  On an individual level, Muslims in the armed forces would more acutely suffer the pernicious effects of racism.

Hopefully the killings at Fort Hood will be viewed as an isolated event without broader implications for Muslim-Americans serving their country.

The Difficulty of Training Local Security Forces

The main pillary of American strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq is to train local security personnel so that they can eventually secure their countries without US assistance.  But such a task is very difficult, especially in Afghanistan.

The following are major obstacles to success when it comes to building up Afghan and Iraqi security forces: widespread negligence; a dearth of trainers; equipment shortages; corruption; insurgent infiltration; a lack of competent foreign NCOs; illiteracy (in Afghanistan); and cultural differences.

Below are links to articles that go into greater detail about the challenges facing US and NATO forces when it comes to training foreign recruits:

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/06/world/asia/06training.html?hpw

http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/training-and-trusting-local-forces/

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/21/canadian_officer_yes_to_mcchrystal_and_heres_why

The Iraqi forces that the US have trained in Iraq will soon be put to the ultimate test when American troops leave the country in 2011, although unresolved political issues, rather than military incompetence, might be to blame if instability increases dramatically after the US withdraws.

There is no timetable when it comes to leaving Afghans responsible for their own security.  Many analysts seem overly optimistic about the prospects of short-to-medium-term success in terms of augmenting the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police.  It may require decades of training efforts to enable them to operate effectively and independently, and there is no guarantee that they will be able to secure their country even after that amount of time has elapsed.  The Obama administration will have to take this into consideration as it debates whether to send 40,000 more soldiers and Marines to Afghanistan to combat the growing  Taliban insurgency.

America’s Use of Private Contractors in War Zones

On Tuesday, the New York Times published an op-ed piece by columnist Tom Friedman about America’s use of private contractors in war zones (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/04/opinion/04friedman.html?em). The article is very illuminating, and it evokes important questions regarding the use of non-governmental personnel to implement foreign policy.

Readers might also find interesting the following books about security contractors:

1. Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq

By David Isenberg

2. Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror

By Robert Young Pelton

3. Big Boy Rules: America’s Mercenaries Fighting in Iraq

By Steve Fainaru

4. Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Combat-Iraq, Afghanistan, and Future Conflicts (The Changing Face of War)

By James Carafano

5. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry

By P.W. Singer

6. A Bloody Business: America’s War Zone Contractors and the Occupation of Iraq

By Gerry Schumacher

7. One Nation, Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy

By Allison Stanger

Descriptions and reviews of the books can be found on Amazon.com.

Ignatius, Friedman and Ricks on Afghanistan

Last week, op-ed columnists Tom Friedman of the New York Times and David Ignatius of the Washington Post both voiced their opinions about what the US should do in Afghanistan.  Mr. Friedman argues that America should begin to withdraw its forces from the country (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/28/opinion/28friedman.html?_r=1&em).  Mr. Ignatius takes a different view and says that the Obama administration should approve Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s request for 40,000 additional troops to combat the Taliban insurgency (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/29/AR2009102903921.html).

On his blog, The Best Defense, military analyst Tom Ricks provides an interesting critique of the two arguments (http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/30/afghanistan_a_pundits_smackdown).

Mr. Ignatius gives a very detailed analysis of the situation on the ground in various localities of Afghanistan, and he has recently spoken to military commanders and gotten their assessments about the way things are going.  Mr. Ignatius’ weak point is his optimistic assumption that the Afghan security forces will be able to secure their country without US assistance in the foreseeable future.

Mr. Friedman focuses on broader trends and historical cases of political transformation in the Middle East to make his case.  The most dubious part of his argument is his injustified assumption that if America pulls out of Afghanistan the following will happen: the Afghan Taliban will fight amongst themselves and fail to regain power because of the strength of local warlords; the Pakistani government will defeat the Islamic militants in their country; and Osama Bin Laden will inevitably be killed by a drone aircraft if he ever emerges from his hiding place.  The first two scenarios will not come to fruition if history is any indicator, and it highly unlikely that Bin Laden will be killed by an airstrike if the US does not leave enough forces in Afghanistan to maintain and defend its airfields from the Taliban and other hostile elements.

Pulling out of Afghanistan is a good idea if one assumes that the US cannot achieve its objectives there in a reasonable amount of time.  But it would be naive to assume that doing so would not have serious negative consequences.

Why Iran Backed Out of a Nuclear Deal

Yesterday, the New York Times published an illuminating news analysis article by Michael Slackman in which he discusses domestic politics in Iran and its relations to the nuclear issue http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/03/world/middleeast/03iran.html?ref=global-home). 

Last month, Iran tentatively agreed to a deal with the West and Russia over its nuclear program but then backed away from it before anything was signed.  The deal would require Iran to ship most of its uranium out of the country for it be enriched and then returned to the Islamic Republic for use in a research reactor.  The measure was designed to ease Western concerns that Iran will use its stockpile of uranium to build nuclear weapons, and it would do so by preventing Iran from enriching its uranium to weapons-grade levels.  The Islamic Republic denies that it seeks to acquire the Bomb.

Mr. Slackman argues that reformists and traditional conservatives oppose the nuclear deal because Mr. Ahmadinejad supports it.  He says that they are trying to turn public opinion against him for their own political advantage.

Mr. Slackman offers some interesting insights, but he seems to underestimate the degree to which many Iranian leaders believe that maintaining the capability of building nuclear weapons is critical for Iran’s national security.  It may be true that some public figures see political benefits in undermining the Iranian president, who won the last presidential election amid widespread complaints of voting fraud, but Iranian security concerns and perceptions of national interests should not be discounted.