Archive for the ‘Middle East’ Category

What’s in a Name?

February 5, 2010

Occasionally I post something  that provides comic relief for those who often study the darker side of international relations.  In that spirit, here is a link to an amusing article about Akbar Zeb, a Pakistani ambassador who was rejected by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE because the Arabic translation of his name is synonymous with a slang term for a certain part of the male anatomy.

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Missile Defenses in the Middle East

February 1, 2010

Administration and military officials have announced that the US is deploying additional missile defense systems in the Middle East/Persian Gulf.  The deployments include Patriot missile batteries in Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Bahrain (similar batteries have long been stationed in Israel and Saudi Arabia), as well as Aegis cruisers armed with missile interceptors that are positioned in the Persian Gulf.  The moves are intended to counter the threat posed by Iran’s short -range and medium-range missiles; Western leaders fear that the Islamic Republic is developing nuclear warheads (Iranian leaders deny that they seek to acquire the Bomb) that could be launched by the aforementioned delivery vehicles against other countries in the region or America’s military forces. 

The US wants to prevent Iran, which is viewed as a hostile nation, from joining the nuclear club.  The administration has tried to resolve the crisis through diplomacy and threats of economic sanctions if the Iranian regime does not agree to take steps that would make it difficult for its scientists to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels.  In December of last year, Tehran accepted a deal to ship its unprocessed uranium abroad but backed out before it was finalized.

According to administration officials, the US is deploying the missile defense systems for the following reasons:

1. To reassure its Arab allies and dissuade them from building their own nuclear arsenals for deterrence purposes.

2. To deter Iran from developing the Bomb or using it against American interests in the region.

3. To persuade Israel not to launch a preemptive military strike against Iranian nuclear sites.

It is doubtful if the deployments will have much of an effect on the situation.  They might provide a modicum of psychological comfort to Arab leaders, but American security guarantees (i.e., promises to come to the defense of its friends and allies in the event of an Iranian attack) would better achieve that purpose.  The US has already suggested that it would retaliate against Iran if the Islamic Republic launched a nuclear strike, and that threat should be sufficient unless Arab governments do not consider it to be credible.

When it comes to deterring Iran from creating an atomic arsenal, missile defense systems will not likely change the decision calculus of Iranian leaders, who understandably fear that America will invade their nation and almost certainly want nuclear weapons to protect themselves from perceived external threats; such weapons would be a good deterrent because no country would want to invade a nuclear Iran and risk suffering an atomic counterattack even if the invading forces, or its allies, possessed missile defense systems that could lower the chances that a nuclear-armed missile would get through.  As far as dissuading Iran from launching a first strike, the threat of nuclear retaliation alone would be enough to deter the Islamic Republic, so Patriot missiles are superfluous in this regard.

Israel already had Patriot missiles before the US put more in the region, and putting interceptors in Arab countries and the Persian Gulf would not substantially change Israel’s security status because Israel is not very close to the Gulf and Patriots are terminal-phase defense systems (meaning they are designed to destroy incoming warheads shortly before they detonate in the target area), so basing them in Arab states would not protect Israel.  Israel has its own nuclear arsenal, but if the Jewish state still feels like that is not enough to deter Iran from hitting Tel Aviv with atomic weapons the mere presence of more Patriot missiles and Aegis cruisers will not stop Israeli leaders from bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Nuclear weapons would not be the greatest threat to American interests emanating from the Islamic Republic if Iran becomes a nuclear power.  The country’s ability to use terrorist groups (such as Hamas and Hezbollah) as proxies, foment instability in Iraq and Afghanistan, and close down the Straits of Hormuz, through which a large percentage of the world’s oil supply transits, are much more plausible methods that Iran could employ against the US and its partners in the region. 

However, theater missile defense systems are not without purpose.  They could be useful in knocking down Iranian missiles armed with conventional warheads in the event of a conflict.  Although the odds that Iranian leaders would launch a nuclear first strike are extremely low (unless their country were invaded), there is a significant probability that they would use regular missiles to attack American military bases, large ground formations or the cities of US allies if a war involving the Islamic Republic broke out in the Middle East.

Walter Russell Mead Classifies Obama

January 27, 2010

In a cover article for Foreign Policy magazine, international affairs analyst Walter Russell Mead discusses President Obama’s strategic worldview and warns that the president may suffer the same fate as Jimmy Carter, whose presidency was brought down largely by foreign policy mishaps. 

Mr. Mead says that there are essentially four philosophical archetypes that US presidents can embody when it comes to determining America’s role in international affairs: Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Wilsonian and Jacksonian.

1. Hamiltonians are foreign policy realists who believe the a strong US government should actively pursue its strategic and economic interests at home and abroad.

2.  Jeffersonians want to limit America’s foreign policy commitments and focus on improving living conditions in the US.

3. Wilsonians are idealists who believe America should actively promote democratic values and human rights at home and abroad even if it means acting against its narrower strategic interests.

4. Jacksonians are conservative populists who distrust political/economic/social elites but tend to strongly support confrontation and the use of force when it comes to security policy.

Mr. Mead argues that the president is a schizophrenic Jeffersonian-Wilsonian.  However, an examination of his polices indicates that he is more of a Hamiltonian.  It is difficult to see how someone who bailed out the banks, enacted a huge economic stimulus package, tripled the US troop commitment in Afghanistan, ramped up the drone airstrike campaign in Pakistan, increased the military budget, downplayed China’s human rights violations and tried to diplomatically engage hostile authoritatian states like Iran and North Korea can be considered a Jeffersonian-Wilsonian.  I am not suggesting that all of the aforementioned policies are misguided (some of them are wise); I am merely disagreeing with Mr. Mead’s categorization.

Containing a Nuclear Iran

January 19, 2010

Last Friday, ForeignPolicy.com published an op-ed piece by Michael Singh in which he discusses the implications of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.  Mr. Singh makes the following arguments:

1. There is no possibility of a rapprochement between the US and Iran similar to the one President Richard Nixon achieved when he went to China in the early 1970s.

2. Iranian leaders might use nuclear weapons because their rationality is open to question.

3. There is a significant chance that Iran would give atomic bombs to terrorist allies like Hezbollah or Hamas.

4. Iran becoming a nuclear power would fundamentally change the security situation in the Middle East.

5. Arab states would respond to Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons by building their own.

6. The US could not contain a nuclear-armed Iran.

It appears that Mr. Singh is correct in asserting that a major diplomatic breakthrough between the US and the Islamic Republic is unlikely at the present time.  Hardliners in Tehran remain vehemently anti-American and they continue to view the US, which has surrounded their country with its military forces and expressed sympathy for Iranian dissidents who are calling for democratic reforms, as a threat to their regime.  Moreover, they face no strategic threat from a third party that would compel them to seek an alliance with the US for counterbalancing purposes.

Mr. Singh’s suggestion that Iran might launch a nuclear first-strike against Israel or other nations is absurd.  He observes that the certainty of massive retaliation would probably dissuade them from doing so, but he says that the possibility should not be discounted because Iranian leaders might be irrational.  Although some political elites in Iran have railed against Israel and leveled threats against it, Iranian leaders are not suicidal.  The West should not react hysterically to their rhetoric; after all, Nikita Khrushchev said his country would “bury” the US, but neither he nor other Soviet leaders intended to attack the US with nuclear weapons unless they were attacked first.

A similar counterargument can be used to discredit his warnings that Iran might give the Bomb to terrorist groups.  If groups like Hezbollah or Hamas detonated a nuclear device in Israel, Israeli policymakers would assume that Iran was behind the assault and they would respond by destroying Tehran and other sites with their atomic arsenal.  Once again, Iranian leaders are not suicidal.

Whether Iran “going nuclear” would fundamentally change the security situation in the region is highly questionable.  Mr. Singh says that Iran would act more aggressively and give more weapons to militant groups, but they are already doing that in Lebanon, Israel-Palestine and Iraq, and they do not need nuclear weapons to do such things without suffering serious consequences.  Arab states like Egyt and Saudi Arabia would certainly be very concerned about their Persian rivals having the Bomb, but they would not necessarily create their own arsenals if the US extended a nuclear umbrella over them; America promised to protect Japan and Germany from their nuclear-armed adversaries and successfully prevented proliferation in those two countries. 

They idea that Iran could no longer be contained if it joins the nuclear club is unfounded.  The US has the capability to thwart a conventional attack against is allies in the region and prevent Iranian naval forces from closing the Strait of Hormuz for an extended period of time.   Nuclear deterrence still works for reasons mentioned above, and Iran would not have a greater ability to aid terrorist groups because atomic bombs are not the type of weapons that a state would want to pass on to extremists.  Despite what Mr. Singh claims, America and its partners could still contain a nuclear Iran and protect their interests much like they contained Russia during the Cold War.

The Security Situation in Yemen

January 12, 2010

Earlier today, the New York Times published an op-ed piece by Edmund Hull, the former US ambassador to Yemen, in which he seeks to counter four so-called  “myths” about the country where he served.  He says that the following are popular misconceptions about Yemen:

1. The Yemeni government’s control does not extend much beyond the capital, Sana.

2. Yemen is a Qaeda haven because it is the ancestral home of Osama Bin Laden, who is supported by tribes in Hadhramaunt Province.

3.  Yemen is torn by Sunni-Shiite divisions, much like Iraq.

4. Yemeni tribes have an inherent affinity for Al Qaeda or terrorism.

Mr. Hull’s assertions do not paint a full picture of the situation.  Although it is true that the Yemeni government has some influence outside Sana, there are large areas of the country where the government is weak, including the northwest  region where an insurgency persists.  Al Qaeda thrives in such places where they are less vulnerable to attacks by security forces; Somalia and the tribal regions of Pakistan are similar regions where militants have a relatively safe haven.

Although Yemeni tribes might not have an “inherent affinity” for Islamic militant groups, they have sheltered Islamic extremists in the past.  Muhammad al-Hanq, who was recently captured after a gun battle, is a tribal leader in Yemen and the head of the Arhab cell of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.  Tribes and clans are loyal to members who join terrorist groups, and they are obligated by custom to protect those who seek their hospitality, including anti-American militants.  Consequently, the tribal nature of Yemen may pose a challenge to counterterrorism forces.

There are also significant religious divisions in Yemen, although they may be less serious there than they are in Iraq.  There is a secessionist movement in the south of the country, where residents are primarily Sunni Muslims, against the government in the north, where Shiite Muslims predominate (President Ali Abdullah Saleh is a Shiite).  Southerns believe that northerners have unfair economic priviliges, and religious differences might be perceived as one reason for the discrimination.  Al Qaeda is comprised of Sunni extremists, and they might be able to exploit the north-south conflict if it turns violent.

These facts probably will not matter much when it comes to America’s policy toward Yemen.  The US will almost certainly continue to provide the state with intelligence, financial aid and military assistance (such as training and weapons) while carrying out targeted attacks with drone aircraft and special operations teams.  The US will not have a large presence in Yemen nor will it engage in nation-building efforts like it has in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Yemeni officials will have to deal with the political, cultural and socioeconomic facets of their country on their own when it comes to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies.