Following the conclusion of the London conference on Afghanistan yesterday, it became clear that the West’s exit strategy for the war-torn country can be summed up in three words: Build, Buy, Leave.
Build–The US and its NATO allies are trying to recruit and train more Afghans security personnel. The Western coalition wants to increase the size of the Afghan National Army (ANA) from approximately 100,000 troops to 178,000 by October 2011 while adding 14,000 patrol officers to the Afghan National Police (ANP), which currently has 95,000 patrolmen. Plans call for the security forces to eventually total 400,000, comprised of 240,000 soldiers and 160,000 police.
Buy–Britain and Japan have agreed to donate $500 million to help the Afghan government persuade Taliban fighters and their commanders to lay down their arms and engage in peaceful politics. Officials believe that militants can be bought off with promises of money, protection, jobs and political appointments.
Leave–America and its European partners have said that they will begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan next year when security conditions are expected to improve. Western leaders want to reduce casualties and costs at a time when the war is becoming increasingly unpopular at home. They also fear that an extended foreign presence will alienate Afghans and make them turn against international forces.
The odds that the coalition’s exit strategy will work according to plan are low. Nearly doubling the size of the Afghan army in less than two years may not be feasible because recruiting and training quality troops takes a lot of time, and the problem is exacerbated by the fact that 90 percent of Afghans are illiterate, which means that training manuals cannot be widely used. Most Western soldiers are engaged in combat or combat support duties, so there might not be enough military trainers to do the job. The current police force is considered by many to be corrupt and ineffective, so augmenting the ANP might not make much of a difference in terms of improving security on the local level.
Buying off the Taliban probably will not be as easy as some policymakers think. Although some lower echelon militants have left the battlefield after being offered incentives by the government, the latter has not lived up to its end of the bargain; safety and employment for former fighters remain elusive. In addition, many Taliban, especially senior leaders, are ideological fanatics and ardent nationalists who are determined to drive foreign elements out of their country and re-establish an Islamic state, and they seem to believe that their ultimate victory is inevitable if they continue their attacks.
Pullout Western troops out of Afghanistan next year would likely create a security vacuum given the strenth of the insurgency and the high probability that the Afghan security forces will not be much stronger by then. In that case, the US and NATO will have to choose between maintaining their current operational footprint or letting the situation on the ground deteriorate. If they go with the second option they will have to scale back their objectives, which now include defeating the Taliban, facilitating economic development, increasing the capacity of the government to deliver basic services to its citizens and protecting human rights.
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